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Primary health services exist with the purpose of providing basic health care to every 
person at a cost they can afford. But is it fully available to everyone? The objective of 
this work project is to estimate the demand for primary health care services having into 
account that in some regions the citizens are not using as much health care as they 
would like due to supply side constraints. Using the number of consultations as proxy 
for demand, and applying an econometric tool called switching regression, the demand 
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In modern countries, health has been perceived as one essential condition for the 
evolution of societies. The certainty of a good healthy condition in the future is a big 
incentive to the investment in the present and consequently to economic growth. The 
knowledge that most probably one will be healthy in the future or will not need to pay 
for health care implies less concern for the individual and thus a smaller need to save 
money in order to prevent against uncertainty. So, if free health care is guaranteed to a 
person at the amount of use, that person will not need to save the same amount to 
protect her against doubt as she would otherwise. That decrease in uncertainty 
encourages the individuals to invest in future life projects and consequently it ends up 
helping economic growth. Besides, public health care is also one of the trademarks of 
equal opportunities. The concept of health care to everyone goes towards the idea that 
all the people will be able to invest in their future given that their health condition is 
pretty much assured. In that sense, many developed countries around the world created 
public systems of health that would promote that believe of guaranteed health care to 
each one of its citizens. 
In this thesis we will focus on the primary health care services which are an important 
part of the National Health Service (NHS). The objective of the primary health care 
services is to provide basic health care to every individual in our country at a cost they 
can afford. These services are the ones through which the individuals make the first 
contact with the NHS and thus, they are generally placed near the population. 
The question that arises when one thinks about the primary health care services is the 
following: Is everyone able to use the primary health care services as it is supposed to? 
The answer is clear. Many persons in our country do not have a family doctor and need 
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to wait a lot of time in order to attend to a consultation in the primary care centers. The 
primary health service is not complying with the objective of granting basic health care 
to all Portuguese citizens. The way to solve this problem is to estimate the demand for 
primary health care services for each region in order to understand how the resources 
need to be allocated in a way such that the ideals of the service are really applied. 
In that sense, the proposal of this thesis is to find the demand for primary health care 
services in each region of Portugal using as a proxy the number of treatments occurred, 
more specifically, the number of consultations. But, the usage of the primary health care 
services in many cases does not correspond to the real needs of the population. So, this 
method would only hold if we assumed that the citizens are enjoying enough supply in 
their residence area. Under that assumption the estimation would be reasonable since 
people consume the quantity of health care correspondent to their demand. However 
this is not true because the services provided are not sufficient in many regions, leading 
the people to consume less than they would consume in other circumstances. 
 For a given generic price the supply may be capable of satisfying the demand and then 
we will be able to identify the real demand of health care (situation illustrated by S1, S2 
and S3.). With a restriction on the supply (illustrated by S’), the quantity will be Q’ 
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independently of the price and therefore the real demand will not correspond to the 
number o consultations.  
Given the problem of supply constraints, the answer lies in finding the areas where there 
is sufficient supply and the ones where there is a shortage. Then, we need to determine 
what would be the usage of primary health care services by the population facing a 
shortage in supply if they would live under the condition of sufficient supply. This 
question will be answered when taking the predicted values for the number of 
consultations in each region using the estimated coefficients of the sufficient supply 
regime. Also, we will be able to know how many resources are required in order to 
provide a good service to everyone in a particular region. In order to do that, we need to 
see how many consultations would occur in a regime of sufficient supply and then 
attribute to them the correspondent costs per consultation. 
Specificities of the health care market 
Before we can go further in this analysis, it is essential to understand the market of 
health care. Like in usual markets, it has a good, a demand and a supply. However, this 
market has some specificities that make it more complex than traditional markets.  
The demand for health care is in fact a derived demand in the sense that people are 
actually looking to increase their health, and health care services are the natural way to 
achieve it. Health care does not give a direct utility to the consumer as it happens with 
common goods. The improving in the health condition in consequence of the 
consumption of health care will allow the individual to improve is quality of life, and 
that will increase his utility. 
Another specificity of the health market lies in the fact that satiation comes much faster 
than in traditional markets. The consumption of health care can only go until a point 
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where the individual is in a perfect state of health and from there onwards the time loss 
in dislocation and in the waiting for a medical treatment can be seen as costs without 
correspondent benefits since the patients are already healthy. That way, given the fast 
achievement of satiation in this market, the consumer’s utility curve can even become 
negative as the use of health care oversteps the real needs of one individual. 
The last specificity arises from the non homogeneity and interdependence of 
consumption. In health care, consumption may come from different markets within the 
sector. One person can make consumption in health care by buying medicines in the 
pharmaceutical market, by attending a simple consultation in a health center, by doing 
exams in a laboratory and so on. There are many goods and services available in the 
health care market and therefore the good provided is considered to be non-
homogeneous. The interdependence in consumption comes from the fact that many 
goods/services are related and one may need to consume one of them in order to 
consume the other. For example, many drugs demand a doctor’s prescription and 
consequently, in order for an individual to buy them, it is necessary to attend a 
consultation first. Same goes with exams that can be only prescribed by a physician and 
then need to be seen by the physician as well.  
Even though these three specificities are the general ones contemplated in health 
economics literature, we cannot ignore the social, cultural and political components 
associated to health. In economic and politically developed countries such as Portugal, 
health care is seen as a fundamental right of the population which means that everybody 
should have access to essential health services. That mentality ends up putting a lot of 
responsibility in the shoulders of the governments that need to guarantee that a good 
service is provided to all. Of course this tremendous duty is not easy to comply with, 
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both because of the great amount of institutions and people involved, as well as for the 
enormous inherent costs. 
After studying the general features of the market of health care it is possible to extract 
some information that will be useful to construct a solid reasoning as a base for this 
thesis. The study will focus on the primary health care which is a submarket in the 
market of health and thus follows the specificities stated before. The interdependence 
between the consumption in different health submarkets needs to be taken into account 
when making inference about the primary health care services, namely in the 
dependence between these services and the hospital services, with one normally 
preceding the other. Also, it is important to have into account the condition of rapid 
satiation in the market of health care that forces anyone who is studying this subject to 
give even more attention to the concept of efficiency. By giving more resources to areas 
living in a restricted condition in terms of health care we will have a significantly 
greater impact than giving them to other areas with a good supply of health care. This 
idea gives strength to the hypothesis that estimating the demand for health care services 
will help the policymakers in the task of better allocating resources which will help 
increase efficiency.  
Worthy of being highlighted is the fact that in health care, efficiency and equity are 
actually coupled since a bad allocation of resources will imply that we are giving more 
to certain regions than we are giving to others. Conversely, if we decide to take 
resources from one region with excess supply and redistribute them to those living with 
a scarce supply, then we are increasing both efficiency and equity. With a good 
estimation, policymakers are able to make more solid choices in the sense they will 
have a base for better defining priorities in terms of resources distribution.  
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Endogenous Switching Regression 
Now that the problem is defined and the objective of this thesis is specified, we need to 
find the instrument that will allow us to make an empirical analysis, always having into 
consideration the limitations concerning the shortage of supply in some regions. 
Because we are in the presence of two distinct regimes, one where the supply covers all 
the demand and other where supply is insufficient, we cannot move to a simple 
regression model with all observations within it. Instead, we need to construct a model 
with the two separated regimes, illustrating the two possible supply conditions. This 
split is essential since we believe that the two distinct situations will yield different 
coefficients. Also, we need to define whether an observation is in one regime or in the 
other. To overcome this problem, the solution lies in finding an instrumental variable 
that may give us information concerning the regime of each observation. Summarizing, 
our model will be one in which we have two different regimes, yielding different 
coefficients, and is defined by another variable that has explanatory power relating to 
the switching of observations between regimes. This model is called switching 
regression model
1
 and is described in the following way: 
                  
                  (1.1) 
                                                          (1.2)       
                                                                                                        (1.3) 
In this model,     is the dependent variable in the continuous equations while     and 
    are the explanatory variables vectors and    and    are vectors of coefficients.    is 
                                                          
1
 For more details on the model consult Lokshin, Michael and Sajaia, Zurab, (2004) 
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the dependent variable of the defining equation,    is the correspondent vector of 
explanatory variables and   is the coefficients vector. 
This model will be the tool used in order to make empirical inference. All we have to do 
is to define the dependent variable for the main regression, the dependent variable for 
the rule regression and the explanatory variables for each of them. Our     will be the 
number of consultations per capita since it implicitly represents the demand of the 
consumers for primary health care services. Our    will be the rate of people without 
family doctor in each region which is a variable with explanatory power on determining 
the situation we are facing in terms of being in a sufficient or insufficient supply 
regime. The estimation of    will determine the probability of each observation to 
belong to one or another regime which will subsequently be incorporated in the 
likelihood function.  
Applying the model 
The data used in order to estimate the demand for primary health care services was 
provided by the ACSS (Administração Central do Sistema de Saúde – Central 
Administration of the Health System) and consists on the main information that 
characterizes the 74 ACES (Agrupamento de Centros de Saúde – Groups of Primary 
Care Centers) in Portugal.  The data includes socio-economic variables, measures of 
costs of each ACES, variables characterizing the supply of primary health care services 
and variables with information regarding hospital supply. The socio-economic variables 
are the ones that will allow us to evaluate the effect of the population characteristics on 
the dependent variable. With those we will be able to choose a certain type of 
population and take conclusions about the estimation of the dependent variable either in 
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the regime of sufficient supply or in the regime of insufficient supply. The variables 
concerning costs, characterization of supply and usage of the services will be useful to 
complete the information about the ACES both in terms of explanatory variables and of 
dependent variables for the continuous and selection equation. Hospital data will be 
useful to evaluate the relation between the two types of services. 
With this data, we are able to fill in the model, choosing our dependent variable, our 
rule to determine whether an observation is in the first or second regime, and also, our 
explanatory variables. In order to better organize the information, let us deal with the 
two regressions (Main regression and Rule regression) separately. 
Main regression: 
Endogenous variable: 
Total consultations per capita on the primary health care services – As has been 
discussed, this is the variable that would tell us approximately the real demand of the 
population in case there was not a problem of insufficient supply. The number of 
consultations was converted in the number of consultations per capita with the purpose 
of eliminating the scale problems given that the level of population in each region 
would obviously drive the results, which would affect the efficiency and the explanatory 
power of the regression. 
Exogenous variables: 
Rate of feminine population – Is well known that women tend to use in average more 
health care services than men independently. Studies point out that this effect is verified 
independently of age. Also, the number of consultations tends to be even higher for 
women due to pregnancy related issues.  
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Total dependency ratio – Similarly to the previous variable, studies show that children 
and old people use more health care since they have more fragile health conditions. In 
the case of the children, because their bodies are still not totally developed, and, in the 
case of the elders, because their health stock is depreciating as their bodies become 
weaker. In that sense, these age groups have a tendency to make more use of health care 
services. Given that, it is important to take this variable into account in the regression. 
Population density – Regions with a large population density are usually associated 
with problems of diseconomies of scale in the sense that it is difficult to put together 
conditions for more people in less space. The Health System seems to also suffer from 
that issue since in areas with greater population density, people often struggle to attend 
a consultation in a public primary care center. These types of areas are also associated 
with problems of pollution and stress which may be also important to control. 
Purchasing power – This is a quite used variable in almost all economic related issues 
since it is always interesting to know the effect of money on social and economic 
matters. In this specific case it is reasonable to ask if people with more purchasing 
power will avoid more the public health sector when it implies they have to face a 
shortage of supply, and consequently more waiting time. Also, it is important to discuss 
if the government gives less resources to areas with more purchasing power concerning 
their superior capacity of resorting to the private sector. 
Usage index of hospital admissions decreed by physicians – Here we have a different 
type of variable since it is not a socio-demographic indicator. Knowing if the number of 
people being admitted in a hospital influences the number of people visiting the doctor 
in a primary health care service allows us to take some conclusions regarding the 
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interaction between the two services. More specifically, if a higher offer in terms of 
hospital admissions may lead to a decrease in the consultations in primary health care 
services. This may happen because many admissions occur for individuals with chronic 
diseases that correspond to an important part of the demand for primary health care. 
After admissions in the hospitals, many of them continue being followed by the hospital 
services and physicians.    
Costs with Drugs and complementary means of diagnosis and therapeutic per capita 
(MCDT – medicamentos e meios complementares de diagnostic e terapeutica) – The 
costs of the MCDT per capita give us some information about the way the government 
distributes resources among ACES which in turn may provide an idea of priorities in 
terms of regions. More importantly, it gives us information regarding the effect of a 
greater offer of complementary treatments on the number of consultations per capita. 
Demand for primary health care services will also depend on this variable since MCDT 
as the name suggests are complementary to consultations and therefore an important 
part of primary health care. 
Rule Regression 
Endogenous variable: 
Rate of persons without family doctor – The rate of persons without family doctor 
illustrates very well the difficulties of the supply side to satisfy the demand. It is well 
known that many people have never had a family doctor and the health authorities have 
struggled to provide enough physicians to the primary health care services. 
Consequently this is a very good way to evaluate the supply conditions in respect to this 
sector of public health services. Nevertheless, we are still facing a problem of defining 
the adequate threshold for that rate to express in the best way the regime each 
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observation is in. Analyzing the observations and resorting to some intuition and 
capacity of judgment, the decision fell on a rule of a 10% threshold. This value seems to 
be adequate given the characteristics of the Portuguese primary health care system. In 
Portugal, a rate of people without family doctor inferior to 10% can be considered very 
low given that in some cases it achieves values around 50%. The threshold of 10% also 
happens to be convenient since it divides the sample in two almost equal parts. This 
way we are dividing the country in the ACES with more resources and the ACES with 
fewer resources in terms of family doctors supply. Dividing the sample in two similar 
parts ends up being a reasonable decision since the analysis has a strong comparative 
component highlighting the differences between most favored and less favored ACES in 
terms of primary health care supply. 
The indicator was transformed into a dummy taking value of 1 when the rate of persons 
without family doctor is under 10%, which means we consider the observations to be in 
a state of sufficient supply. Above 10%, the variable takes the value of 0 and we 
consider the observations to be in a state of shortage of supply.  
 
Exogenous variables: 
Urgency consultations per capita in primary health care services – The urgency 
consultations are in some way a measure of resources available because in order for 
those to exist there must be money, equipments and doctors. In that sense it may explain 
the quantity of family doctors per person and therefore the number of persons without 
family doctor. This variable has a one year lag in order to avoid some reverse causality 
effects since the number of family doctors can also explain the number of urgencies. 
The idea is to extract only the structural effect in terms of supply of primary health care 
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services. However because the reverse causality may be a reality, one must still be 
careful and account for the possibility of a higher rate of people without family doctor 
implying a greater use of the urgencies services given the lack of alternatives in terms of 
primary health care. 
Population density – This variable has a similar purpose as in the main regression. The 
idea is to know if there are problems concerning the supply of primary health services in 
areas with higher population density, more specifically when providing family doctors. 
The allocation of resources in these areas is usually more difficult and there is a 
tendency for a lack of family doctors in very crowded areas. This structural component 
is important to define the supply of family doctors. 
Usage index of hospital urgency services – this variable should help measuring the 
supply of each ACES evolving area in terms of hospital services. The existence of better 
conditions in terms of hospital supply may weigh in the decision of providing more 
primary health care services, measured in family doctors, in the case of this regression. 
If we consider that hospital urgencies are in some way substitutes regarding primary 
health care services, then the government may choose to restrain supply of these last 
services.  However, we have again a problem of possible reverse causality since larger 
numbers in this indicator may be strongly connected to a poor primary health care 
service in the sense that many people may try to “run from them” and go directly to the 
hospital.  
Index of usage of hospital admissions decreed by physicians– The inclusion of this 
indicator in this equation has the objective of capturing the relation between the supply 
capacity of the hospitals and the supply capacity of the primary health care services. 
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There is a possibility that, in a specific ACES area, there is a strategy of more 
investment in the hospital services and consequently some disregard concerning the 
primary health care. The relation can also be one in which higher capacity in terms of 
hospital supply means higher overall investment in the respective ACES surrounding 
area and thus greater supply of primary health care services. 
Output 
Table 1  
Log pseudolikelihood = -64.644046  
 
Number of obs   =         74 
 Regime 0 – Shortage of supply                             Regime 1 – Sufficient supply 
  
Robust 
Coef. Std. Err.           Robust Coef. Std. Err.       
totconsultpc 0 
   
totconsultpc 1   
purchpower -0.0082253 0.0000628 
 
purchpower -0.0019687 0.0000347 
femalepop 0.2403805 0.0003107 
 
femalepop 0.3422215 0.0008336 
popdensity -0.0000852 2.40E-06 
 
popdensity -0.0003624 0.0000152 
dependence 0.0180252 0.0003433 
 
dependence 0.0217902 0.000288 
hospphysic 0.5741185 0.0126639 
 
hospphysic -1.453434 0.0261756 
MCDTcostspc 0.0302133 0.0000877 
 
MCDTcostspc -0.0141454 0.0000854 
_cons -11.53122 0.0115025   _cons -12.90325 0.025841 
select 
     
  
urgenciespc 0.1633091 0.0265804 
   
  
popdensity -0.0004149 0.0000153 
 
sigma0 0.2359048 0.0005952 
hospurgency -0.3156359 0.0863538 
 
sigma1 0.4347516 0.0008167 
hospphysic 1.246079 0.3298969 
 
rho0 -0.0462266 0.1118851 




Purchasing Power – this variable appears to have a negative impact in both regimes on 
the number of consultations per capita in the primary health care services. Economic 
intuition says that in fact this makes sense because people with more financial capacity 
tend to have better health and consequently do not need to resort as much to the primary 
health care services. Also, persons with more resources may decide to use more private 
health care services which would have impact in the public system usage. Another 
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argument suggests that people with higher purchase power tend to skip the primary 
health care services and go directly to the hospitals. Notice that the effect of the 
estimator is higher for the regime 0 (insufficient supply) which is also expected since 
insufficient supply will have impacts on waiting lines and other costs of resorting to the 
public system. So, as the economic costs of using the public services increase, persons 
with more money gain even more incentives to avoid them. 
Rate of female population – this variable is positive in both regimes which means it has 
a positive impact on the number of consultations per capita. The positive sign was 
expected since in reality women use more health care services than men and so, the 
higher is the rate of female population the higher will be the number of consultations. 
The value of the coefficient is higher for the unrestricted regime which is logical 
considering that women will have more difficulty in attending the consultations and 
therefore they will consume less primary health care.  
Population density – this variable has a negative impact on the number of consultations 
per capita for both regimes. Areas presenting a larger population density are usually 
associated with some scarcity in the relative supply of primary health care services. By 
the coefficient we found, we can verify the veracity of that statement. This probably 
happens because of the difficulty in allocating resources when dealing with very 
crowded places. More people imply a higher quantity of primary care centers or larger 
ones. It involves more doctors, nurses, buildings, equipments, materials, other 
employees, etc… Managing more people and more structures with limited resources 
turns out to be very difficult and to have negative implications on the final service that 
is provided to consumers. It is also possible that resources may be not correctly 
distributed among ACES and those with higher population density are not receiving as 
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much as they should. Regarding the difference in the coefficients for the two regimes, 
we can see that the one for the sufficient supply is larger than the one for the insufficient 
supply. Since the coefficient is negative, we conclude that higher population density 
leads to a higher decrease in the number of consultations per capita for the unrestricted 
regime. However, there is no evident economic reasoning for this difference. Such 
disparity may be justified by the numbers of the indicator in question that are 
considerably higher in the ACES of regime0 like the ones from Lisboa and Porto. These 
outliers are driving the coefficient to a considerably lower value. 
Total Dependence Index – This variable coefficient is positive in the two regimes which 
means that a marginal increase in this indicator leads to an increase in the number of 
consultations per capita. There is no doubt that the age classes that need more medical 
attention are the two in the dependence index. The younger class includes the children 
that are more fragile since they are not fully developed yet and consequently are subject 
to more health problems that will lead them to consume more health care. The older 
class is the one of the elders that have a greater deprecation of their health condition by 
definition. So, it only makes sense to have the dependence index increasing the number 
of consultations. Concerning the differences between the two regimes, the coefficient is 
higher in regime 1. If people do not face as much constraints in the sufficient supply 
regime they will obviously use more the service than the ones in the restrained regime. 
Index of usage of hospital admissions decreed by physicians – the coefficient for this 
variable presents different signs for the two regimes. In the unrestricted regime, the 
coefficient is negative, which means that more admissions by physicians in the hospitals 
imply a decrease in the number of consultations on primary health care centers. That 
result may be reasonable since many potential users of the primary health care services 
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can be captured by the hospitals services, especially knowing that many of these 
patients suffer from chronic diseases. This type of patients is used to make regular visits 
to the primary care centers and may start being treated in the hospitals. 
For the restricted regime, a negative sign on the coefficient would not make sense 
because even if the hospitals can steal some of the clients from primary care centers, 
there would be a lot of other people ready to “fill in the vacancy”. The positive value of 
the coefficient, however, suggests that in the presence of a restricted value the two 
services are complementary. In this case, it is possible that the effect is just an 
association, with another cause inducing it.  
Costs with Drugs and complementary means of diagnosis and therapeutic per capita – 
similarly to the last variable, this one also presents a positive coefficient for the 
restricted regime and a negative coefficient for the unrestricted regime. In the presence 
of an insufficient supply, an increase in the MCDT leads to an increase in the number of 
consultations in primary health care services. When dealing with restricted conditions, 
increases in costs are usually related to an increase in capacity and quality which means 
turning the regime less limited. This obviously has a positive influence in the usage of 
the service. In the regime of sufficient supply, an increase in MCDT leads to a decrease 
in the number of consultations. It was expected that it would not have the same effect as 
in the restricted regime but not exactly a negative one. This result suggests that in 
unrestricted regimes, MCDT have impact on quality and not on quantity ensuring a 
better treatment related to each consultation (even if it is complementary) and therefore 





Rule Regression:  
Urgencies – This indicator presents a positive sign suggesting that an increase in the 
number of urgency consultations in the primary health care services increases the 
probability of a given ACES to be in the sufficient supply regime. The variable is 
probably working as a proxy for the investment in physicians from each ACES. More 
urgency consultations imply more structural conditions such as doctors and 
consequently more supply available concerning the distribution of family doctors. 
Population density – The negative coefficient indicates that ACES with higher 
population density have less probability of enjoying sufficient supply of family doctors. 
Population density is a factor that influences the efficiency in the allocation of resources 
and, therefore, it makes sense to observe more people without family doctors in areas 
with greater values for this variable. 
Usage index of hospital urgency services – The coefficient for this variable is negative, 
which means that more usage of the hospital’s urgency services leads to a lower 
probability of being in a state of sufficient supply in terms of primary health care 
services. This result may arise from two hypotheses. On one hand it may suggest that in 
some areas there is a greater investment in hospital structures in detriment of the 
investments in primary health services and thus, a larger supply of one service implies 
less supply of the other. On the other hand, it may be a consequence of reverse causality 
since less supply of primary health care services in terms of family doctors may drive 




Index of usage of hospital admissions decreed by physicians – The coefficient is 
positive meaning that higher usage in terms of hospital admissions increases the 
probability of an ACES belonging to the sufficient supply regime. This may suggest an 
association (and not direct causality) in which higher capacity in terms of hospital 
supply means higher overall investment in the respective ACES area and thus greater 




With the output of the previous table we are now able to take the predicted values for 
each of our observations. The coefficients yielded for both regimes will allow us to 
derive the number of consultations that each ACES should have, according to the 
estimation. More importantly, we can use the coefficients of the unrestricted regime and 
apply them to the observations of the restricted regime, getting that way a prediction for 
the number of consultations the restricted ACES would have if not facing supply side 





prediction values for 
regime 0 
prediction values for 
regime 1 
Famalicão 2.866227 2.809422 3.215112 
Braga 2.705395 2.708673 3.263269 
Gerês/Cabreira 3.254874 3.201327 3.605773 
Barcelos/Esposende 3.021037 2.922247 3.555988 
Baixo Tâmega 2.827451 2.938267 3.630411 
Vale do Sousa Norte 2.792556 2.921525 3.045667 
Vale do Sousa Sul 3.210755 2.740669 3.295226 
Santo Tirso/Trofa 3.490349 3.193511 3.26851 
Porto Ocidental 3.656441 3.822991 0.912746 
Porto Oriental 4.037422 4.03584 1.405413 
Baixo Vouga I 3.481852 3.3382 3.361208 
Pinhal Interior Norte II 3.868766 3.793168 3.63895 
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Dão Lafões III 3.438768 3.209184 3.645247 
Lisboa Norte 2.600566 2.705766 1.917353 
Lisboa Oriental 3.040978 2.820529 1.567463 
Lisboa Central 2.680866 2.655382 2.035713 
Oeiras 2.358782 2.047352 2.80028 
Odivelas 1.744967 1.845662 1.530696 
Loures 2.432309 2.642897 2.692794 
Amadora 2.284467 2.368222 0.9664361 
Sintra-Mafra 2.125694 2.263912 3.009858 
Algueirão - Rio de Mouro 1.81685 2.012212 3.432603 
Cacém-Queluz 1.652823 1.895166 3.72433 
Cascais 2.235277 2.344553 3.167268 
Vila Franca de Xira 2.104619 2.128432 3.489881 
Almada 3.139459 2.751584 2.711807 
Seixal - Sesimbra 2.525116 2.248858 3.467855 
Arco Ribeirinho 2.541005 3.023467 3.273274 
Setúbal- Palmela 2.428608 2.680946 3.281621 
Oeste Norte 2.870529 2.981924 3.399954 
Oeste Sul 2.459432 2.840478 3.400342 
Serra d'Aire 2.654446 2.930797 3.750112 
Zêzere 3.147637 3.338531 3.522911 
Ribatejo 3.428332 2.791273 3.153685 
Lezíria II 3.098489 3.106843 3.504259 
Central 2.411115 2.299051 3.168006 
Barlavento 2.372283 2.174469 3.046841 
Average for total restricted 
regime ACES 2.778555189 2.771171081 2.969158435 
 
In this predicted values table we find the estimation for the number of consultations in 
the two different supply regimes coefficients to be significantly different for the 
restricted regime observations. The results show that in the restricted regime ACES 
would consume more 0,2 consultations per capita if living in a state of sufficient supply. 
Adding to these values the ones predicted for the unrestricted regime would give us a 
national average of consultations in a hypothetical regime of sufficient supply greater 
than the actual observed number of consultations in approximately 0.1 consultations per 
capita. This implies that the state would need to do an extra effort in terms of resources 
to supply this level of services. Given an average cost for the consultations of 52,35€  
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the government would have to incur in a financial effort of approximately 53 million 
euros given the statistics.  
The values in red 
The values in red are the ones that seem to make no sense. Nevertheless, a deeper 
analysis may uncover some characteristics that are generating those values. All the 
regions in question present very high values of population density (Lisboa, Porto and 
respective Suburbs). The problem is that these values are very strong outliers and are all 
in the regime of insufficient supply. Because the same does not happen in the sufficient 
supply regime, the coefficient is considerably higher and has a big effect when applied 
to the previous observations, in this way contaminating our predictions. However, 
health policies should not penalize the ACES with a large population density. Living in 
an area of higher population density should not be a reason for people to experience less 
supply of basic health care services. The ideal of the primary health care services is that 
everyone should have equal access to basic health care and therefore, population density 
should not play a role in that matter. 
Having the previous logic into account, it is possible to take the predicted values for the 
ACES in red, this time not taking into account the effect of the population density. In 
order to do that we computed the mean population density of all ACES and substituted 
it in all the red ACES population density values. That value was also applied to all other 
ACES in the restricted regime in order to eliminate the inferior outliers as well. The 





Predicted values for 
regime 0 
predicted values for regime 1 
(altered) 
Porto Ocidental 3.656441 3.822991 2.394239866 
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Porto Oriental 4.037422 4.03584 2.88690736 
 Norte 2.600566 2.705766 3.59859533 
 Oriental 3.040978 2.820529 3.248704948 
 Central 2.680866 2.655382 3.716955365 
Odivelas 1.744967 1.845662 3.306947935 
Amadora 2.284467 2.368222 3.202949806 
 
Using the average of the population density we eliminated the excess effect that the 
variable was inducing to the predicted values of the ACES in question. Now, the results 
are much more acceptable and as we can see, all the Lisboa area is living in a 
considerable state of insufficient supply of primary health care services. This outcome 
suggests that the state should invest more in the Lisboa area in order to provide the 
necessary services of health to the people. The Porto area however continues presenting 
a smaller value in the predicted values than in reality. A closer look to the real number 
of consultations of all the 74 ACES shows us that even though Porto is in regime 0, it 
presents two of the highest values for this indicator. Clearly, these areas are not in a 
state of insufficient supply albeit the rate of people without family doctors being 
superior to 20% for both zones. 
With the changes in the population density values, the overall results for the average 
number of consultations per capita for all ACES and the extra level of expenditures that 
need to be done by the government will increase. The average number of consultations 
increased from 3,2 to 3,31 and is now superior to the real value (3,1) in 0,21 
consultations per capita. Knowing that each consultation has a price of 52,35€ for the 
National Health Service, the costs will increase by 11€ per capita which means an 
absolute cost increase of approximately 111 million euros. An important note must be 
made on the fact that this is a ceteris paribus analysis since an increase in the supply of 
primary health care consultations will certainly have an impact on other variables such 
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as urgencies, either from hospitals or from permanent attendance services. It is pretty 
reasonable to assume that urgencies will decrease as a consequence of more 
consultations. For the analysis to be complete is important to make an estimate for the 
consequent saves in urgencies. The weighted average price of urgency episodes 
(hospitals and permanent attendance services) is 85€. The relation between this price 
and the price of primary care centers consultations allow us to know what should be the 
composition of an increase in the supply of primary health care services in order to yield 
no costs for the NHS. If 61% of the increase was a result of stolen episodes from the 
urgencies services, then the costs of creating more supply conditions would be the same 
as the saves in urgencies costs. Knowing the real composition of the increase in the 
number of consultations would allow the computation of the real costs to the NHS. For 
instance, if that percentage was 30%, the costs would decrease by a half making a 
project of this type much more appealing. 
Final Remarks 
In this work project, we estimated the demand for primary health care services by the 
observed consumption in terms of primary care centers consultations. In order to do that 
we had to address the problem of the observed levels of consumption, in some 
observations, being defined by supply side constraints and not by the demand of 
consumers. Resorting to a switching regression and using the ACES data, the estimation 
was held and some interesting conclusions were taken. However, the model in question 
presented many problems in terms of estimation. The switching regression model is a 
very sensitive instrument and proved itself not to be very reliable when applied to the 
problem addressed in this work project. The lack of data, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively also presented an unpleasant challenge mainly in determining the rule 
25 
 
regression. These two problems together created major difficulties in generating a 
statistical output, driving the use of less intuitive variables tainted with causality 
problems. Consequently, the credibility of the model was jeopardized. 
By running the regression we got the coefficients of the explanatory variables for both 
the restricted and unrestricted regime. With them we computed the predicted values 
assuming that all observations were in the sufficient supply condition and thus subject 
to the unrestricted regime coefficients. The results turned out to be the expected ones 
with a significant increase in the number of consultations of the supply constrained 
ACES. Still some observations in the metropolitan area of Lisboa and Porto presented 
strange values driven by the outliers in the population density variable. The problem 
was solved by fixing the value of population density for the restricted regime. 
Finally, after dealing with the problems, the values estimated in this work project, 
allowed us to know the estimated demand for primary health care consultations in 
Portugal and the extra amount of resources needed to achieve the ideal of those services. 
With an extra number of consultations per capita being 0.21, the NHS would need to 
spend more 111 million euros on consultations. Still, this value is based on a ceteris 
paribus analysis and does not have into account the potential saves in urgency services. 
In conclusion, the ideal of the primary health care services of providing sufficient basic 
health care service to everyone can only be achieved through more expenditure. Since 
Portugal in the last years has been trying to decrease the expenditures in the sector of 
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for regime 0 
prediction values 
for regime 1 
famd
oc10 
ACES_ Trás-os-Montes I - 
Nordeste 3.413573 3.246997 3.416209 1 
ACES_ Trás-os-Montes II - 
Alto Tâmega e Barroso 3.064265 3.310904 3.290372 1 
ACES_Douro I - Marão e 
Douro Norte 3.288338 2.94201 3.301453 1 
ACES_ Douro II - Douro Sul 3.946378 2.957247 3.67581 1 
ACES_ Ave I - Terras de 
Basto 3.886566 3.371692 3.373744 1 
ACES_ Ave II - 
Guimarães/Vizela 3.536749 2.74171 2.95772 1 
ACES_Ave III - Famalicão 2.866227 2.809422 3.215112 0 
ACES_Cávado I - Braga 2.705395 2.708673 3.263269 0 
ACES_Cávado II - 
Gerês/Cabreira 3.254874 3.201327 3.605773 0 
ACES_Cávado III - 
Barcelos/Esposende 3.021037 2.922247 3.555988 0 
ACES_Tâmega I - Baixo 
Tâmega 2.827451 2.938267 3.630411 0 
ACES_Tâmega III - Vale do 
Sousa Norte 2.792556 2.921525 3.045667 0 
ACES_Tâmega II - Vale do 
Sousa Sul 3.210755 2.740669 3.295226 0 
ACES_Porto I - Santo 
Tirso/Trofa 3.490349 3.193511 3.26851 0 
ACES_Porto II - Gondomar 3.121216 2.827618 3.031635 1 
ACES_Porto III - Valongo 3.04062 2.7852 3.074351 1 
ACES_Porto IV - Maia 2.544566 2.13367 3.305923 1 
ACES_Porto V - Póvoa do 
Varzim/Vila do Conde 2.971925 3.094994 3.313918 1 
ACES_Porto VI - Porto 
Ocidental 3.656441 3.822991 0.912746 0 
ACES_Porto VII - Porto 
Oriental 4.037422 4.03584 1.405413 0 
ACES_Porto VIII - Gaia 2.623268 2.783488 2.943259 1 
ACES_Porto IX - 
Espinho/Gaia 3.452784 2.564198 3.069899 1 
ACES_Entre o Douro e Vouga 
I - Feira/Arouca 3.119093 2.444498 3.577223 1 
ACES_Entre o Douro e Vouga 
II - Aveiro Norte 3.217659 3.001484 3.297595 1 
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ACES_Baixo Vouga I 3.481852 3.3382 3.361208 0 
ACES_Baixo Vouga II 3.449982 2.999461 3.004776 1 
ACES_Baixo Vouga III 3.532444 3.035573 3.186855 1 
ACES_Cova da Beira 2.764791 3.126985 2.770941 1 
ACES_Baixo Mondego I 3.543615 3.021933 3.473446 1 
ACES_Baixo Mondego II 3.300218 3.15556 3.540359 1 
ACES_Baixo Mondego III 3.671436 3.084395 3.712075 1 
ACES_Pinhal Interior Norte I 3.629346 3.311891 3.630943 1 
ACES_Pinhal Interior Norte II 3.868766 3.793168 3.63895 0 
ACES_Pinhal Litoral I 3.258855 3.290536 3.230165 1 
ACES_Pinhal Litoral II 2.840935 2.903812 3.138086 1 
ACES_Dão Lafões I 3.233759 2.705177 3.72904 1 
ACES_Dão Lafões II 3.542702 3.049021 3.940639 1 
ACES_Dão Lafões III 3.438768 3.209184 3.645247 0 
ACES_Lisboa I - Lisboa Norte 2.600566 2.705766 1.917353 0 
ACES_Lisboa II - Lisboa 
Oriental 3.040978 2.820529 1.567463 0 
ACES_Lisboa III - Lisboa 
Central 2.680866 2.655382 2.035713 0 
ACES_Lisboa IV - Oeiras 2.358782 2.047352 2.80028 0 
ACES_Lisboa V - Odivelas 1.744967 1.845662 1.530696 0 
ACES_Lisboa VI - Loures 2.432309 2.642897 2.692794 0 
ACES_Lisboa VII - Amadora 2.284467 2.368222 0.9664361 0 
ACES_Lisboa VIII - Sintra-
Mafra 2.125694 2.263912 3.009858 0 
ACES_Lisboa IX - Algueirão - 
Rio de Mouro 1.81685 2.012212 3.432603 0 
ACES_Lisboa X - Cacém-
Queluz 1.652823 1.895166 3.72433 0 
ACES_Lisboa XI - Cascais 2.235277 2.344553 3.167268 0 
ACES_Lisboa XII - Vila Franca 
de Xira 2.104619 2.128432 3.489881 0 
ACES_Setúbal I - Almada 3.139459 2.751584 2.711807 0 
ACES_Setúbal II - Seixal - 
Sesimbra 2.525116 2.248858 3.467855 0 
ACES_Setúbal III - Arco 
Ribeirinho 2.541005 3.023467 3.273274 0 
ACES_Setúbal IV - Setúbal- 
Palmela 2.428608 2.680946 3.281621 0 
ACES_Oeste I - Oeste Norte 2.870529 2.981924 3.399954 0 
ACES_Oeste II - Oeste Sul 2.459432 2.840478 3.400342 0 
ACES_Médio Tejo I - Serra 
d'Aire 2.654446 2.930797 3.750112 0 
ACES_Médio Tejo II - Zêzere 3.147637 3.338531 3.522911 0 
ACES_Lezíria I - Ribatejo 3.428332 2.791273 3.153685 0 
ACES_Lezíria II 3.098489 3.106843 3.504259 0 
ACES Alentejo Litoral 3.068553 2.418287 3.509495 1 
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ACES Alentejo Central I 4.284499 3.300348 3.703281 1 
ACES Alentejo Central II 3.894444 2.652448 3.627045 1 
Algarve I - Central 2.411115 2.299051 3.168006 0 
Algarve II - Barlavento 2.372283 2.174469 3.046841 0 
Algarve III - Sotavento 2.729423 2.413621 3.107559 1 
ACES_ULS Matosinhos 3.425663 0.9909232 3.13399 1 
ACES_ULS Alto Minho 4.09627 3.775848 3.809346 1 
ACES_ULS Guarda 2.92522 3.235492 3.958167 1 
ACES Baixo Alentejo 3.664025 2.360594 3.785244 1 
ACES Caia 5.05668 2.554698 4.005961 1 
ACES S. Mamede 5.018028 2.770318 4.109348 1 
ACES_Beira Interior Sul 3.180307 3.150373 3.693449 1 
ACES_Pinhal Interior Sul 3.776536 3.425212 3.965863 1 
          







ACES Population Density 
ACES_Porto VI - Porto Ocidental 5099.8 
ACES_Porto VII - Porto Oriental 5099.8 
ACES_Lisboa I - Lisboa Norte 5651 
ACES_Lisboa II - Lisboa Oriental 5651 
ACES_Lisboa III - Lisboa Central 5651 
ACES_Lisboa V - Odivelas 5913.2 




















prediction values for 
regime 1 (altered) 
famd
oc10 
ACES_ Trás-os-Montes I - 
Nordeste 3.413573 3.246997 3.416209884 1 
ACES_ Trás-os-Montes II - 
Alto Tâmega e Barroso 3.064265 3.310904 3.290372485 1 
ACES_Douro I - Marão e 
Douro Norte 3.288338 2.94201 3.301453165 1 
ACES_ Douro II - Douro Sul 3.946378 2.957247 3.675809553 1 
ACES_ Ave I - Terras de 
Basto 3.886566 3.371692 3.373742513 1 
ACES_ Ave II - 
Guimarães/Vizela 3.536749 2.74171 2.957707922 1 
ACES_Ave III - Famalicão 2.866227 2.809422 3.092157722 0 
ACES_Cávado I - Braga 2.705395 2.708673 3.246782397 0 
ACES_Cávado II - 
Gerês/Cabreira 3.254874 3.201327 3.283543783 0 
ACES_Cávado III - 
Barcelos/Esposende 3.021037 2.922247 3.311851473 0 
ACES_Tâmega I - Baixo 
Tâmega 2.827451 2.938267 3.319776709 0 
ACES_Tâmega III - Vale do 
Sousa Norte 2.792556 2.921525 2.888756145 0 
ACES_Tâmega II - Vale do 
Sousa Sul 3.210755 2.740669 3.060222683 0 
ACES_Porto I - Santo 
Tirso/Trofa 3.490349 3.193511 3.093807456 0 
ACES_Porto II - Gondomar 3.121216 2.827618 3.031612568 1 
ACES_Porto III - Valongo 3.04062 2.7852 3.07432877 1 
ACES_Porto IV - Maia 2.544566 2.13367 3.305894061 1 
ACES_Porto V - Póvoa do 
Varzim/Vila do Conde 2.971925 3.094994 3.31390871 1 
ACES_Porto VI - Porto 
Ocidental 3.656441 3.822991 2.394239866 0 
ACES_Porto VII - Porto 
Oriental 4.037422 4.03584 2.88690736 0 
ACES_Porto VIII - Gaia 2.623268 2.783488 2.943229066 1 
ACES_Porto IX - 
Espinho/Gaia 3.452784 2.564198 3.069868989 1 
ACES_Entre o Douro e 
Vouga I - Feira/Arouca 3.119093 2.444498 3.577218998 1 
ACES_Entre o Douro e 
Vouga II - Aveiro Norte 3.217659 3.001484 3.297591052 1 
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ACES_Baixo Vouga I 3.481852 3.3382 3.049850059 0 
ACES_Baixo Vouga II 3.449982 2.999461 3.004773081 1 
ACES_Baixo Vouga III 3.532444 3.035573 3.186850871 1 
ACES_Cova da Beira 2.764791 3.126985 2.770941331 1 
ACES_Baixo Mondego I 3.543615 3.021933 3.473444935 1 
ACES_Baixo Mondego II 3.300218 3.15556 3.540358662 1 
ACES_Baixo Mondego III 3.671436 3.084395 3.712074682 1 
ACES_Pinhal Interior Norte 
I 3.629346 3.311891 3.630942692 1 
ACES_Pinhal Interior Norte 
II 3.868766 3.793168 3.290084959 0 
ACES_Pinhal Litoral I 3.258855 3.290536 3.23016488 1 
ACES_Pinhal Litoral II 2.840935 2.903812 3.138084653 1 
ACES_Dão Lafões I 3.233759 2.705177 3.729038622 1 
ACES_Dão Lafões II 3.542702 3.049021 3.940638321 1 
ACES_Dão Lafões III 3.438768 3.209184 3.311421542 0 
ACES_Lisboa I - Lisboa 
Norte 2.600566 2.705766 3.59859533 0 
ACES_Lisboa II - Lisboa 
Oriental 3.040978 2.820529 3.248704948 0 
ACES_Lisboa III - Lisboa 
Central 2.680866 2.655382 3.716955365 0 
ACES_Lisboa IV - Oeiras 2.358782 2.047352 3.797233073 0 
ACES_Lisboa V - Odivelas 1.744967 1.845662 3.306947935 0 
ACES_Lisboa VI - Loures 2.432309 2.642897 2.740593716 0 
ACES_Lisboa VII - Amadora 2.284467 2.368222 3.202949806 0 
ACES_Lisboa VIII - Sintra-
Mafra 2.125694 2.263912 2.95604706 0 
ACES_Lisboa IX - Algueirão 
- Rio de Mouro 1.81685 2.012212 3.378790583 0 
ACES_Lisboa X - Cacém-
Queluz 1.652823 1.895166 3.670517919 0 
ACES_Lisboa XI - Cascais 2.235277 2.344553 3.506170944 0 
ACES_Lisboa XII - Vila 
Franca de Xira 2.104619 2.128432 3.287709717 0 
ACES_Setúbal I - Almada 3.139459 2.751584 3.202075786 0 
ACES_Setúbal II - Seixal - 
Sesimbra 2.525116 2.248858 3.391539872 0 
ACES_Setúbal III - Arco 
Ribeirinho 2.541005 3.023467 3.039939622 0 
ACES_Setúbal IV - Setúbal- 
Palmela 2.428608 2.680946 3.01360566 0 
ACES_Oeste I - Oeste Norte 2.870529 2.981924 3.094031691 0 
ACES_Oeste II - Oeste Sul 2.459432 2.840478 3.09268124 0 
ACES_Médio Tejo I - Serra 
d'Aire 2.654446 2.930797 3.43813752 0 
ACES_Médio Tejo II - 
Zêzere 3.147637 3.338531 3.182308589 0 
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ACES_Lezíria I - Ribatejo 3.428332 2.791273 2.824680124 0 
ACES_Lezíria II 3.098489 3.106843 3.151445049 0 
ACES Alentejo Litoral 3.068553 2.418287 3.50949607 1 
ACES Alentejo Central I 4.284499 3.300348 3.703282123 1 
ACES Alentejo Central II 3.894444 2.652448 3.627047229 1 
Algarve I - Central 2.411115 2.299051 2.859331229 0 
Algarve II - Barlavento 2.372283 2.174469 2.708087131 0 
Algarve III - Sotavento 2.729423 2.413621 3.107560082 1 
ACES_ULS Matosinhos 3.425663 0.9909232 3.133943059 1 
ACES_ULS Alto Minho 4.09627 3.775848 3.809345153 1 
ACES_ULS Guarda 2.92522 3.235492 3.958166906 1 
ACES Baixo Alentejo 3.664025 2.360594 3.785245344 1 
ACES Caia 5.05668 2.554698 4.005962345 1 
ACES S. Mamede 5.018028 2.770318 4.109349013 1 
ACES_Beira Interior Sul 3.180307 3.150373 3.693450495 1 
ACES_Pinhal Interior Sul 3.776536 3.425212 3.965862707 1 
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Urgência 
1 — O preço do episódio de urgência para os hospitais do SNS é de: 
a) Serviço de urgência polivalente — 147 €; 
b) Serviço de urgência médico -cirúrgica — 108 €; 
c) Serviço de urgência básica — 51 €. 
2 — A classificação por tipo de urgência é a presente no despacho n.º 5414/2008, de 28 
de Janeiro. 
3 — O preço do episódio de urgência inclui todos os procedimentos e meios auxiliares 
de diagnóstico e terapêutica realizados durante aquele episódio. 
4 — Não há lugar à facturação dos atendimentos urgentes que tenham dado lugar a 
internamento do doente. 
5 — Serviço de atendimento permanente — 36 €. 
6 — Aos valores dos números anteriores acresce o valor do transporte nos termos 

















Número de Urgências 
Hospitalares 
 Serviço de Urgências 
Médico-Cirúrgica 147.0 0.5 3154138.7 
 Serviço de Urgências 
Polivalente 108.0 0.4 2391247.4 
 Serviço de Urgência 
Básica 51.0 0.1 865464.9 
 Total   1.0 6410851.0 
 
     






  Serviço de Atendimento 
Permanente 36.0 3911267.0 
  
     
     









Serviço de Urgências 
Médico-Cirúrgica 147.0 3154138.7 0.3 33.0 
Serviço de Urgências 
Polivalente 108.0 2391247.4 0.2 34.1 
Serviço de Urgência 
Básica 51.0 865464.9 0.1 4.3 
Serviço de Atendimento 
Permanente 36.0 3911267.0 0.4 13.6 
Total   10322118.0 1.0 85.0 
 
